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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 940521-CA 
v. 
SHAUN LYNN FORSBERG, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 
1981), the State of Utah files this Brief of Appellee in response 
to the "Anders" brief filed by counsel for defendant-appellant 
Shaun Lynn Forsberg. Forsberg appeals his conviction for "repeat 
offender" driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1994). 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1994). 
I QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant Forsberg advances a single issue on appeal, 
which his appellate counsel asserts is frivolous: Whether 
Forsberg Should be Allowed to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, Based 
Upon His Assertion that the Plea was Induced by a Prosecutor 
Agreement, Subsequently Breached, to Make a "No Incarceration" 
Recommendation at Sentencing?1 
State's counsel, however, has reviewed the record on' 
appeal, and believes that it discloses another issue that may not 
be frivolous: Whether Porsberg Should be Allowed to Withdraw his 
Guilty Plea, Because the Plea Was Not Taken In Strict Compliance 
with the Standards of Rule 11/ Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure/ 
and Utah Caselaw? 
Standard of Review: Because Forsberg's appellate 
counsel files his brief accompanied by a motion to withdraw as 
counsel, under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), this 
Court must make a "full examination of all the proceedings" and 
decide whether the appeal is "wholly frivolous." Anders, 386 
U.S. at 744/ State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Flores, 855 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah App. 1993). This is 
necessarily a de novo process, in which deference to the trial 
court (or to appellate counsel) is neither possible nor 
appropriate. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1994), which sets the 
offense levels for driving under the influence of alcohol, and 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing the 
*In his statement of the issue, Forsberg's appellate counsel 
miscasts the issue as one of sentencing discretion (Br. of 
Appellant at 1) . However, elsewhere in his brief, he properly 
identifies the "breached prosecutor promise" issue as one that, if 
proven, would allow withdrawal of Forsberg's guilty plea (Br. of 
Appellant at 7, 10) . 
2 
acceptance of guilty pleas, are copied in appendix I of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Forsberg was charged with driving under the influence 
of alcohol, with three prior convictions under the same section 
within three years, which constitutes a third degree felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1994) (R. 1). Pursuant to a 
plea bargain, he pled guilty to the charge (R. 10, 48-55). 
Forsberg was sentenced to a prison term of zero to five years--
with, however, the trial court's recommendation that he be 
paroled to inpatient alcohol rehabilitation "as soon as 
reasonably possible" (R. 25-26, 64). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The pertinent facts are those related to the entry of 
Forsberg's guilty plea; the transcript of the arraignment and 
plea process (R. 45-56) is copied in appendix II of this brief. 
Forsberg's appellate counsel accurately recites that before 
entering the plea, the prosecutor stated the terms of the plea 
bargain as follows: 
We've agreed basically to allow him credit for 
time served and, if he's going into an in-patient 
program, allow -- recommend that the court allow 
him credit day to day on any time in the in-
patient program against any jail time the court 
wishes to give him. There's no agreement on the 
amount of jail time or whether he will get 
probation. If he does get probation we would 
agree to recommend that he get those credits. 
(R. 48). The trial court then asked if there were any more 
recommendations and defense counsel responded, "no" (R. 48). 
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Forsberg also stated that no other promises had been made that 
had not been disclosed to the court (R. 53). 
The plea was entered orally, without additional 
commemoration by written affidavit. The trial court, questioning 
Forsberg and his defense counsel, ascertained that Forsberg was 
not under influence of alcohol or drugs, or duress (R. 51, 53). 
The court explained the constitutional rights that Forsberg would 
waive by his plea, and secured Forsberg's waiver of those rights 
(R. 51-52). The court stated the statutory elements of the 
crime, and that the prosecutor's sentencing recommendations would 
not be binding upon the court, and again secured Forsberg's 
understanding (R. 52-53). 
The trial court did not explain the minimum and maximum 
sentence for the third degree felony; defense counsel, however, 
stated that he and Forsberg had "talked about the consequences, 
specifically in regards to a plea of a felony, and the prison 
time he could be subjected to" (R. 50). The trial court did not 
request, nor did the prosecutor proffer, the nature of the 
evidence that would show Forsberg's guilt, if the matter were to 
proceed to trial. Ultimately, finding Forsberg's guilty plea 
knowing and voluntary, the trial court accepted it, then warned 
Forsberg about the thirty-day time limit for moving to withdraw 
the plea (R. 54-55). 
Also pertinent to this "Anders" appeal is the fact that 
Forsberg's defense counsel was court-appointed, upon a showing 
4 
that Forsberg is indigent (R. 6). That same attorney now desires 
to withdraw from the case, having filed the "Anders" brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Forsberg's appellate counsel correctly asserts that 
Forsberg's guilty plea was not induced by any broken prosecutor 
promise regarding a sentencing recommendation; hence, Forsberg's 
bid to withdraw his plea on that basis is frivolous. However, 
the record revea] s a question whether the trial court fully, 
complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 
accepting Forsberg's guilty plea. This Court needs to examine 
the record and pertinent caselaw to determine whether this 
question is frivolous. If it is not frivolous, this Court should 
order further briefing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE QUESTION WHETHER FORSBERG'S GUILTY PLEA 
WAS INDUCED BY A FALSE PROSECUTOR PROMISE IS 
FRIVOLOUS 
In the single appellate issue identified by Forsberg's 
counsel, Forsberg argues that under Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 2S7 (1971), he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty 
plea because the prosecutor breached a plea agreement to 
recommend no incarceration for the pleaded-to offense. The State 
agrees wit - jrsberg s coin ise] that that issue is frivolous. 
This :- so reasons. 
First, Forsberg never moved withdraw his plea under 
Santobello "A defendant is oblige* -^- , trial court's 
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ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an appellate 
court." State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) 
(citing cases). He therefore waived this issue by failing to 
present it to the trial court. 
Second, apart from the waiver, Forsberg's Santobello-
based issue is frivolous on its merits. The prosecutor's 
statement prior to entering the guilty plea clearly shows that no 
"no incarceration" recommendation was promised: "There's no 
agreement on the amount of jail time or whether he will get 
probation" (R. 48). 
Were there any doubt about the absence of such promise, 
it was dispelled at sentencing, some two months after Forsberg 
pled guilty. At that time, defense counsel asserted to the trial 
court that "the State has made a recommendation of no prison 
time" (R. 59). The prosecutor immediately corrected that 
misstatement: 
That's not correct. He would receive credit 
for time served and he would receive credit for 
any time served in an in-patient [alcohol abuse] 
program. That can be done whether he goes to 
prison or not. The court can recommend that the 
department of -- that the prison people give him 
credit for whatever time he's served up here. 
There was no agreement on whether or not he would 
go to prison and or serve time in the county jail. 
We would recommend that he receive credit for time 
served. I don't know that he's been in any kind 
of a program. If he has been then he should 
receive credit for that also. 
(R. 59 (emphasis added)). Neither Forsberg nor defense counsel 
then took issue with the prosecutor's foregoing statement of the 
actual plea agreement. Instead, the ensuing discussion focused 
6 
upon the proper sentencing disposition, given Forsberg's 
individual history and needs (R. 59-65). 
In sum, based upon the clear and uncontroverted trial 
court record, Forsberg's SantoJbello-based appellate argument is 
frivolous. His appellate counsel, therefore, should not be 
compelled to pursue this issue on appeal. 
POINT TWO 
THE QUESTION WHETHER FORSBERG'S PLEA WAS 
PROPERLY ACCEPTED IS NOT NECESSARILY 
FRIVOLOUS, AND WARRANTS THIS COURT'S 
CONSIDERATION 
Unfortunately, the State cannot confidently assert that 
Forsberg's entire appeal is frivolous. Under Anders, appointed 
defense counsel must examine the r ecord for any possible 
appellate issues, and can withdraw only upon a showing that no 
non-frivolous issues exist. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (to 
withdraw, counsel must £Ind flhis case to be wholly fr:i vol ous" 
(emphasis added)). This construction of counsel's duties is 
supported by thr~- policy stated in Anders: to "assure penniless 
defendants the- - :i ghts and opportunities on app -eal - as nearly 
as is practicable--as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a 
similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of 
private counsel. " Id at: 74 5. Forsberg's present counsel while 
correctly finding the SantobelJo-based issue to be frivolous, has 
not demonstrated that his client's case is wholly bereft of non-
frivolous app e11 at € is s ue s. 
It appears to the State that a non-frivolous issue, not 
mentioned by Forsberg's counsel, may exist in this case. We 
7 
emphasize "may exist," because it is this Court's duty--not the 
State's — to make this determination. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 
("the court--not counsel--then proceeds . . . to decide whether 
the case is wholly frivolous"). Accordingly, to serve this 
Court, State's counsel points out an issue in this case that may 
not be frivolous, but leaves to this Court the determination 
whether it is or is not frivolous. 
The possibly non-frivolous issue is whether Forsberg 
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not 
taken in strict compliance with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, a requirement that has existed since the Utah 
Supreme Court decided State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 13 09 (Utah 
1987). As follows, this issue encompasses two sub-issues. 
First, there is a question whether rule 11(e) (5), 
requiring that defendant understand the possible minimum and 
maximum sentence, was adequately met, absent a corroborating plea 
affidavit, by defense counsel's spoken assertion that "[w]e've 
talked about the consequences, specifically in regards to a plea 
of a felony, and the prison time [Forsberg] could be subjected 
to" (R. 50). Second, there is a question whether a sufficient 
"factual basis" for the plea was established, under State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671-74 (Utah App. 1993); Jbut see id. at 
677-78 (Jackson, J., concurring) (majority's "factual basis" 
analysis is incorrect). 
This Court must decide whether the foregoing questions, 
which Forsberg's counsel might have raised but has not, are 
8 
frivolous. If they are frivolous, counsel's motion to withdraw 
should be granted, and this Court should affirm Forsberg's 
conviction. If they are not frivolous, further briefing should 
be ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The "breached prosecutor promise" argument advanced by 
Porsluerxi i ;:i frivolous. However, other questions involving the 
validity of Forsberg's guilty plea may not be frivolous. This 
Court needs to carefully review the record on appeal to determine 
the next step in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q( day of March, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (j 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy ol the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to KENT 
E. SNIDER, attorney for defendant-appellant, 2568 Washington 




Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7) (Supp. 1994) 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44 
of Subsection (2Xa); deleted former Subsection local authority that the local authority will 
(3Xb), which provided for the maintenance of comply with Subsections (3) and (4)"; redesig-
reduced speed school zones for state highways nated the subsections in Subsection (3) and 
as required under Section 41-6-21; added a deleted former Subsection (3Xb), which read 
proviso at the end of Subsection (3XbXii); added "Notwithstanding Subsection (aXiiXB) the de-
Subsection (3Xc); and made related changes. partment shall provide for the maintenance of 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 120, effective reduced speed school sones for state highways 
May 2, 1994, deleted "(a) Before January 1, as required under Section 41-6-21"; substituted 
1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2); redes- "Department of Transportation* for "Iranspor-
ignated former Subsections (2XaXi) and tation Commission" in Subsection (6); and 
(2XaXii) as Subsections (2Xa) and (2Kb); de- made stylistic changes, 
leted former Subsection (2Xb), the substance of This section is set out as reconciled by the 
which was incorporated into Subsection (2Xa) Office of Legislative Research and General 
by the addition of "after written assurance by a Counsel. 
ARTICLE 4 
ACCIDENTS 
41*6-29. Operator's duty at accident — Stop at accident — 
Penalty. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Corpus delicti the scene was in fact the driver of the vehicle 
In order for the state to establish corpus and not merely a passenger. State v. Hansen, 
delicti, the state must establish by clear and 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct App. 1993). 
convincing evidence that the person who left 
ARTICLES 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
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(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily iiyury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local 
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed within six years 
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 80 hours nor more 
than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and 
(7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for 
violations committed after April 23,1990. 
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(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 
2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the 
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term 
closely supervised follow through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
[7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony 
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23,1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours 
nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow through after the treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked 
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
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(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after 
July 1,1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilita-
tion costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction 
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed 
after July 1,1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as 
a prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under 
Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying 
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements 
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous convic-
tion under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea ofguilty or no contest to 
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted 
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation, 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of. 
Section 41-6-45 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea ofguilty or no contest 
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for 
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the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the 
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec-
tions (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation 
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended 
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, I 84; C. 1943, Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, I 1; 1957, ch. 75, ment by ch. 159, effective March 17, 1994, 
I 1; 1967, ch, 8S, § 2; 1969, ch. 107,1 2; 1977, added Subsection (SXaXiiXB), making related 
ch. 268, | S; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, changes, and substituted "Section 53-3-223" for 
i 2; 1982, ch, 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, t 13; 1983, "41-2-130" in Subsection (12Xb). 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183,1 33; 1985, ch. 46, The 1994 amendment by eh. 263, effective 
I 1; 1986, ch. 122, I 1; 1986, ch. 178,1 29; May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (12Xa), 
1987, ch. 138, i 37; 1987 (1st SA), eh, 8, t 2; substituted -53-3-223" for "41-2-130" in Subsec-
1988, ch. 17, I 1; 1990, ch. 183,1 16; 1990, tion (12Xb), and made stylistic changes. 
ch. 299,1 1; 1991, ch. 147,1 1; 1993, ch. 168, This section is set out as reconciled by the 
I 1; 1993, ch. 193, ^ 1; 1993, ch. 234, I 32; Office of Legislative Research and General 
1994, eh. 159,1 1; 1994, ch. 263,1 1. Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Searches. corruption of that evidence, justified a warrant-
In a prosecution for driving under the influ- less search of defendant's home. City of Orem v. 
ence of alcohol, exigent circumstances, includ- Henrie, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah Ct App. 
ing the concern of the police about the dissipa- 1994). 
tion of blood alcohol and the possible loss or 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evi-
dence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Failure to comply with standards. tion and validity of the evidence may not be 
Failure to comply fully with standards estab- presumed, but rather that they will have to be 
lished by the Department of Public Safety does established in order for the evidence to be 
not necessarily make breath test evidence in- admitted. Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 223 Utah 
admissible. It simply means that the founds- Adv. Rep. 42 (Ct App. 1993). 
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Rule 10. Arraignment 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the records from the 
magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned 
in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall 
consist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or stating to 
him the substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto. He shall 
be given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to 
plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in which to 
plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding pro-
vided for by statute or these rules prior to arraignment shall be specifically 
and expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is 
waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own recognizance,; 
prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial 
when required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be for-
feited. 
Cross-References. — Harmless error, Rights of accused, Utah Const, Art I, |§ 7 
UJtCr.P. 30. to 13; § 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS thereto; and where defendant was not given 
*jJX- w t J time to plead to such information, court com-
Additional tone to plead.
 witttd ^ ^ ^ e r r o r S t a t e v> Jen8ex i | & 
Waiver of objections.
 U u h 452f 3 0 PJM 203 (1934). 
Additional time to plead. Waiver of objections. 
Where original information did not state Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general 
public offense and was amended so as to state legal rule that all objections, including those to 
public offense for first time, as amending infor- proceedings in the circuit court, must be made 
mation in larceny prosecution so as to allege before a guilty plea is entered or the objections 
ownership of property alleged to have been sto- will be waived. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 
len, it was equivalent of a new information re- 496 (Utah Ct App. 1990), rev'd on other 
quiring arraignment of defendant and his plea grounds, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Key Numbers, — Criminal Law *» 261(1), 
Law §§ 433 to 438. 263, 264. 
C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law f 355 et 
seq. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defen-
dant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insan-
ity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
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(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court, 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Amendment Notes. — Ifce 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1993, revised the subdi-
vision designations, substituting letters for 
numbers and vice versa; inserted "or guilty 
and mentally ill" in the introductory para* 
graph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivision (0; 
rewrote Subdivision (eX3) to list more rights; 
inserted "and if applicable, the minimum man-
datory nature of the minimum sentence" in 
Subdivision (eX5); added Subdivision (eX8); de-
leted "that contemplates entry of a plea in the 
expectation that other charges will be dropped 
or dismissed" after "has been reached" in Sub-
division (hX2); added Subdivision (i); and made 
stylistic changes throughout the rule. 
Cross-References, — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements, 
UJLE. 410. 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, I 77-13-6. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. ) Case No. 941000039 
SHAUN LYNN FORSBERG, 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on May 31, 1994, the 
above-entitled matter came on for arraignment'on the 
Law and Motion Calendar, Box Elder County Courthouse, 
District Court Courtroom, Brigham City, Utah, the 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
* * * 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff 
For the Defendant: 
ROGER F. BARON 
Deputy County Attorney 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
KENT E. SNIDER 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 102 
2568 Washington Blvd 
Ogden, UT 84401 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. O. Box 873 
Brigham City , UT 84302-0873
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COURT OF APPEALS 
1 THE CLERK: Case number 941000039, State of Utah 
2 vs. Forsberg. 
3 MR. SNIDER: Attorney Kent Snider for Mr. 
4 Forsberg, Your Honor. Mr. Forsberg is here. 
5 I THE COURT: This is the time set for arraignment. 
Sir, are you Shaun Lynn Forsberg? 
MR. FORSbERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to confer 
with Mr. Snider? 
MR. SNIDER: Just briefly, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you received a copy of the 
information? 
MR. SNIDER: We have. 
THE COURT: Do you waive the formal reading of 
that information? 
MR. SNIDER: Yes, we do. 
THE COURT: Do you need any additional time to 
consider the matter before entering a plea? 
MR. SNIDER: Not at this time, Your Honor. We 
are prepared today to enter a plea of not guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Forsberg, are you 
currently under the influence of any alcohol or drugs? 
MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you having any difficulty 
understanding the proceedings this afternoon? 
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MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: The information charges you as' 
follows: Driving under the influence of alcoholr a 
felony of the third degree, at Box Elder County on or 
about February 12th, 1994, in violation, of Section 
41-6-44 of the Utah Code. 
As to that charge how do you plead? 
MR. FORSBERG: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: Do counsel feel there would be some 
benefit to schedule this for a pretrial in two weeks? 
MR. SNIDER: I think we can probably settle it by 
then if not sooner, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's set it down, then, 
for June 13th for a pretrial conference at two 
o'clock . 
MR. SNIDER: That would be fine, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Snider, if I do that I'm not 
going to be scheduling a trial until at least the 
13th. Does the defendant waive his right to a speedy 
trial? 
MR. SNIDER: A moment, Your Honor. 
(Pause in the proceedings J 
MR. SNIDER: That's fine, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll set it for June 
13thr two o'clock, for a pretrial. 
Paoe 3 
(Other cases heard.) 
THE CLERK: Case number 941000039, State of Utah 
vs • Forsberg. 
THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to visit 
with your client? 
MR. SNIDER: I have. It's my understanding that 
Mr. Forsberg is prepared to now enter a plea of 
guilty. He'll withdraw his plea of not guilty and 
enter his plea of guilty to the third degree felony. 
The State has some recommendations that they're 
willing to make in this matter. 
MR. BARON: That's correct. We've agreed 
basically to allow him credit for time served and, if 
he's going into an in-patient program, allow --
recommend that the court allow him credit day to day 
on any time in the in-patient program against any jail 
time the court wishes to give him. There's no 
agreement on the amount of jail time or whether he 
will get probation. If he does get probation we would 
agree to recommend that he get those credits. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything more to the 
recommendation? 
MR. SNIDER: No, Your Honor. Mr. Forsberg was 
recently sentenced in Logan on a Class A misdemeanor, 
which actually occurred, I think, after this one. But 
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1 with the timing between the sentencing and whatnot, it 
2 got kind of confused. That presentence report is 
3 already prepared and he's doing time in Logan. The 
4 only thing holding him now from getting into a program 
5 is this charge right now. As soon as he has this 
6 taken care of he can get into a program. I've talked 
7 with AP&P and they'll try and expedite an update on 
8 the Logan presentence report. We should be able to 
9 have it before the court on the 13th. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Forsberg, before I 
11 address you I'm going to ask your attorney a few 
12 questions. I want you to listen closely. I want to 
13 make sure you understand the proceedings this 
14 af ternoon . 
15 Mr. Snider, has the charge been explained 
16 to the defendant by you? 
17 MR. SNIDER: Yes, Your Honor, here and also at 
18 the Circuit Court. 
19 THE COURT: Have you reviewed with the defendant 
20 his Constitutional rights as relate to this 
21 proceeding? 
22 MR. SNIDER: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Do you believe the defendant 
24 understands the nature of the charge against him? 
25 MR. SNIDER: I believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you believe that the plea he's 
about to make is voluntary, knowing and with 
understanding? 
MR, SNIDER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you know of any reason why he 
should not plead guilty at this time? 
MR. SNIDER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is it your opinion that the defendant 
understands the effect and meaning of entering a 
guilty plea? 
MR. SNIDER: Yes, Your Honor. We've talked about 
the consequences, specifically in regards to a plea of 
a felony, and the prison time he could be subjected 
to. He's willing to enter a plea at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Forsberg, have you had any 
difficulty understanding the proceedings this 
a fternoon? 
MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice 
you've received from your attorney? 
MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you need any further time to 
confer with him before we go forward? 
MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You've heard the statements from your 
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1 attorney. Do you wish to enter a guilty plea at this 
2 time? 
3 MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: You are presently not under the 
5 influence of any alcohol or drugs? 
6 MR. FORSBERG: I'm not, sir. 
7 THE COURT: Are you receiving any treatment for 
8 any physical or mental illness? 
9 MR. FORSBERG: In the Cache County jail I've been 
10 seeing a phychologist, I believe they call it, through 
111 Bear River Mental Health. They've kind of been 
12 helping me out up there. 
13 THE COURT: Do you feel that that circumstance 
14 would in any way interfere with your ability today to 
15 understand what we're doing and what you're doing? 
16 MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 MR. FORSBERG: It's for depression, is what I'm 
19 seeing him for. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
21 you have a right to plead not guilty if you so choose? 
22 MR. FORSBERG: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: If you enter a plea of guilty you 
24 have certain rights which you will be waiving. I'll 
25 briefly review those for you. You have the right to a 
speedy trial, the right to a trial before an impartial 
jury, the right to have legal counsel/ either 
appointed by the court or retained by you. You have 
the right to confront and cross-examine the State's 
witnesses and to present a defense in your own behalf. 
You have the right against self-incrimination. You 
have the right to compel witnesses to appear in your 
behalf at no cost to you. You have the right to 
require the State to prove your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If, following a trial, you were 
convicted, you would have the right to appeal that 
convi ction. 
If you plead guilty you waive and lose all 
of the foregoing rights that I've just explained. Do 
you understand that? 
MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to waive all of those 
rights? 
MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The information and the elements of 
the offense which the State would be required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt are as follows: That the 
defendant, on or about February 12th, 1994, did drive 
a vehicle, or was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle, within the state of Utah, while his blood 
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1 alcohol content was .08 percent or greater by weight, 
2 or while under the influence of alcohol; and ha's ha<3 
3 three prior convictions under the above section within 
41 six years* Do you understand that? 
5 MR- FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice 
7 you've received from your attorney? 
8 MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Do you need any more time to talk to 
10 him? 
11 MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
12 THE COURT: Have there been any promises made to 
13 you other than the statements made just now in court 
14 by the prosecutor and your attorney? 
15 MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
16 THE COURT: You understand that any agreement or 
17 any recommendations would not be binding on the court, 
18 that they would simply be recommendations? 
19 MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: Has anyone used any force or pressure 
21 or intimidation to cause you to plead guilty? 
22 MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
23 THE COURT: Are you doing so voluntarily? 
24 MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
25 THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you 
are in fact guilty of the offense? 
MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to 
ask or any statement you would like to make before 
entering a plea? 
MR. FORSBERG: No, sir. 
THE COURT: As to the charge, then, driving under 
the influence of alcohol, a felony of the third 
degree, how do you plead? 
MR. FORSBERG: Guilty. 
THE COURT: The court will accept the guilty 
plea. It appears to the court to be freely, 
voluntarily and knowingly made. The time for imposing 
sentence is not less than two nor more than 30 days. 
We'll schedule this for two weeks. If for some reason 
we encounter difficulties and had to go beyond the 30 
days/ are you willing to waive the 30 day sentencing 
requirement? 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. SNIDER: He is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I need to advise you that 
you may seek, for good cause shown, to withdraw the 
guilty plea, but you must do so within 30 days from 
today's date. If you don't ask to have it withdrawn 
within that 30 day period you forfeit that right. 
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ll Now, I'll schedule this for sentencing on 
2 June 13th at three p.m. We'll ask AP&P to give us ;an 
3 expedited, or updated, report of what was done from 
4 Cache County. 
5 MR. BARON: Can we have the defendant waive his 
6 right to a copy of that ten days prior to the hearing? 
7 MR. SNIDER: We are prepared to do that. I've 
8 discussed that with the defendant and he understands 
9 we have to do that so we can be back here on 'the 13th. 
10 THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a 
11 statutory right to see that presentence report ten 
12 days before sentencing? 
13 MR. FORSBERG: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: If I allow you that right I can't get 
15 you sentenced on the 13th of June. Are you willing to 
16 waive that ten day advance notice? 
17 MR. FORSBERG: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: I suspect that that report will not 
19 be ready until the Friday before sentencing. 
20 MR. SNIDER: More than likely, yes. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Mr. 
22 Snider? 
23 MR. SNIDER: Nof Your Honor. I appreciate the 
24 court's time. Thank you.* 
25 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the arraignment proceed-
ings were taken before me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah 
That said proceedings were reported by me in 
stenotype and thereafter were by me transcribed into 
typewriting; and that a full, true and correct trans-
cription is set forth in the pages numbered 2 to 11, 
inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript 
was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, 
Box Elder County, Brigham City, Utah. 
I further certify that I am not associated with 
any of the parties to said matter and I am not 
interested in the event thereof* 
Witness my hand and official seal at Brigham 
City, Utah, this 7th day of November, 1994. 
Rodney M.UFelshaw, C.S.R. , R.P.R 
My Commission Expires: 
January 4, 1996 
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